"The nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan are the having the opposite effect that they did in the Cold War," said Visiting Prof. Paul Kapur of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Claremont-McKenna College. "With the government in India not cowed by the threat of a nuclear attack, and Pakistan using its weapons as an excuse for hostile action, the occurrence of border clashes has increased."

Kapur spoke last night on nuclear security considerations in South Asia at a meeting of Stanford's International Security Forum (ISF).

"My friend and I founded the ISF last year because we believed that there was not enough international security discussion happening on campus," said event organizer Zubin Agarwal, a junior. "We believe that Prof. Kapur would provide us with valuable insights into the security issues of the [Indian] subcontinent."

Kapur spoke on his latest research, which provides insight into the security environment in South Asia and how the introduction of nuclear weapons has changed the relationship between India and Pakistan.

According to Kapur, nuclear weapons have divided the scholarly community into two opposing camps. One holds that the weapons provide a deterrent to conventional warfare, while the other asserts that militaries are subject to the same constraints as other complex organizations and are therefore just as likely to commit an error of judgment.

Analyzing the frequency of hostile actions between the two nations prior to and after their establishment as nuclear powers, Kapur's research has found that the probability of military action has increased by more than 60 percent since the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The majority of skirmishes have involved the "Line of Control," which splits the disputed region of Kashmir into Indian- and Pakistani-governed halves.

Puzzled by this finding, Kapur dug deeper and sought to understand why nuclear weapons were not acting as deterrents, but were rather increasing the likelihood of aggressive behavior.

He found that the issue could be traced as far back as 1972, at the end of the Bangladesh conflict. It was around this time that studies conducted by the Pakistani government showed political leaders that if they were to ever engage in a full-scale conventional war with India, the chances of victory or a standstill were minimal.

Kapur elucidated how nuclear weapons acted as the trump card in Islamabad's policy--the Indians could be bled of resources and personnel by indirectly supporting the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir, but the threat of nuclear escalation would prevent India from reacting with conventional forces. The implementation of this strategy resulted in huge financial losses for the Indian government, which had to deploy security forces year-round.

Responding to questions from the audience, Kapur also speculated on the future of Indo-Pakistan relations. He cited current Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf as a source of stability for his nation, but--noting his unpopularity within the military and intelligence branches--Kapur was quick to acknowledge that a coup could easily change the country's nuclear policy. The presence of a nuclear flashpoint in the region, he added, ensured that the battle over Kashmir would continue as, in his view, neither side will rescind their claim to the area in the near future.

With hands still raised in the audience, Kapur concluded the seminar with a few last comments.

"Nuclear weapons are not causing the conflict between India and Pakistan, but it is certainly not the case that things have gotten better," he said. "They [nuclear weapons] are not serving as a deterrent but have escalated the tensions between the two nations. The situation is much more tenuous than one might think."