CISAC experts on North Korea and weapons systems weigh in on the technical and political ramifications of the failed launch of a multi-stage rocket that was to place Pyongyang’s first satellite in obit. Co-director Siegfried Hecker; Visiting Scholar Robert Carlin; and Affiliates Nick Hansen and Lewis Franklin believe a third underground nuclear test will now follow – another move Washington and its allies perceive as threatening and provocative. The White House said after the failed rocket launch: “North Korea’s long-standing development of missiles and pursuit of nuclear weapons have not brought it security – and never will.”

The North Koreans insisted the rocket launch was to put a civilian satellite into orbit. Were there any other motives behind the attempted launch?

Hecker: The primary purpose of this launch appears to have been to put an earth-observing satellite in space, but it uses similar rockets to ones that could launch an intermediate- or long-range missile with the potential of eventually carrying nuclear warheads. So, even if a satellite launch is the primary objective, this one has dual-use benefits. 

The launch failed, but did North Korea learn from the process?

Franklin: In any engineering endeavor, failures are a great source of learning. While I haven't heard any reports of the expected telemetry signal from the Unha 3; this would be a critical way they could learn what went wrong. Another way to is to inspect the debris, but from what I hear, many of the monitoring ships of the U.S., Japan and South Korea are rushing to the debris splash locations to pick up what they can.

What would a successful missile launch mean for the geopolitics of the region?

Carlin: Unfortunately, it would bring us closer to the day when the North has a nuclear-armed missile force. That realization may finally – though a bit too late – focus the attention of various capitals in the region on the fact that their approach toward the North over the past 12 years have failed, and that the kabuki of the Six Party talks, later joined with policies of “strategic patience” and “behavior modification,” wasted time and opportunities that we could not afford to lose.

Franklin: To my surprise, the North Koreans for the first time admitted their launch failed, although without reporting any specifics as to what failed, only that the satellite failed to orbit. The leadership has been trying to launch at satellite for 13 years; this failure now gives South Korea another chance to beat them to space.

Satellite images indicate tunnels have been dug and that Pyongyang could soon conduct another underground nuclear test. Do you believe another test is imminent – and what are the driving forces behind a third test?

Hecker: There were reports a couple of years ago that North Korea had apparently prepared a third tunnel in the Kilju region, where the first two nuclear tests were conducted. The South Korean news media reported a few days ago that there was activity near the tunnel entrances. I believe their ultimate aim is to make a warhead that is sufficiently small and light to mount on a missile. Missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead at intermediate or intercontinental distances would be considered a credible deterrent. I believe North Korean scientists and engineers have been working to design miniaturized warheads for years, but they will need to test to demonstrate that the design works: no nuclear test, no confidence. Unlike the claim that Pyongyang can make that its space launch is purely for civilian purposes, there is no such civilian cover for a nuclear test. It is purely for military reasons.

Hansen: There has been recent activity seen at the test site in satellite imagery. Also, there was the pattern of a long-range rocket launch followed by tests in 2006 and 2009.

Carlin: From a technical standpoint, another test could help the North prove a design for a small enough nuclear weapon to fit on a missile. From a political standpoint, a third test increases uncertainty about the North’s intentions and calculations.

We know North Korea has the bomb. What’s in its arsenal and where does it stand on the capability of using those weapons?

Hecker: My estimate is that Pyongyang has four to eight plutonium-fueled rudimentary bombs like the one that destroyed Nagasaki. Rudimentary means big (the Nagasaki fat-man bomb was roughly 10,000 pounds and was delivered by a B-29 bomber) and, hence, it must be delivered by plane, boat or van.  In addition to capability, one also must consider Pyongyang’s intent. I do not believe that North Korea’s leadership has any plans to bomb the United States, its assets or allies. However, it wants to hold U.S. interests at risk of a nuclear attack to deter us from regime change and to create international leverage and diplomatic maneuvering room.

Any chance North Korea has fielded a bomb fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU)?

Hecker: Until 2009, Pyongyang claimed it had not pursued uranium enrichment. Then, in November 2010, John Lewis, Bob Carlin and I were shown the smoking gun in their Yongbyon nuclear facility – a modern, sophisticated centrifuge facility. Whereas our hosts claimed they did not begin this program until April 2009, it is simply not possible to accomplish what they showed us in less than a decade or two. I am quite convinced they have another facility somewhere else, and that facility may be producing HEU bomb fuel. My own sense is that the quantities are very limited at this point – and that’s why our efforts should be dedicated to making sure they don’t enlarge these facilities. Therefore, it is possible they may have a few HEU-fueled bombs, but to our knowledge they have not tested any.

North Korea tested plutonium devices in 2006 and 2009. Were they successful?

Hecker: The October 2006 test was only partially successful. It is now believed that its explosive yield was somewhat less than 1 kiloton (1,000 tons of TNT equivalent). By comparison, the yield of the Nagasaki bomb was 21 kilotons. I believe they intentionally created a crisis in early 2009 with a missile launch so they could justify the second test after the predictable international condemnation of the missile launch. That test had an explosive yield of nearly 5 kilotons. I consider that successful. If they can produce 5 kilotons, they can likely produce 20 kilotons.

If Pyongyang goes forward with another test, what type is it likely to be?

Hecker: My estimate is that they have only 24 to 42 kilograms of plutonium. They voluntarily shut down their plutonium production reactor in July 2007. Hence, it is risky for them to use up their precious plutonium resource for another test, especially since they have no plutonium in the pipeline. Consequently, they may be preparing for an HEU device.

But haven’t all the other nuclear countries gravitated to plutonium, as it’s more potent?

Hecker: Yes, plutonium is more desirable for miniaturized bombs and warheads. However, Pyongyang may have decided to switch to HEU for a number of reasons. For example, they may feel confident that they can produce a lot more HEU than plutonium in the long term now that they have apparently mastered centrifuge technologies. They may have received the design from Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan for a warhead small enough to mount on some of their missiles, much as what the late Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi bought from Khan. If so, they may believe that HEU designs offer a quicker path to a nuclear-tipped missile. But let me offer this caution: We really don’t know.

The United States had warned the launch would result in the North losing its badly needed food aid. Pyongyang said the cancellation of food aid would kill the moratorium on uranium enrichment and nuclear tests. Who stands to gain more here and why? 

Hansen: The U.S. loses, as we were informed this launch was their plan many months ago and still went ahead with the agreement. The DPRK looses the food aid for their people – but they seem to care less about them anyway. The sanctions don’t seem to bother them much either. With friends like China and Iran, they seem to get much of what they need.

Carlin: In the short run, the North Koreans can certainly live without the small amount of food aid that the U.S. offered.  And by now, much as it would like to get out from under sanctions, the North is adept at living with them and, where necessary, getting around them. On the other hand, the chance both to gain entry for the IAEA to see the North’s uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon and to start a process of fruitful bilateral negotiations that could sustain a North Korean nuclear test moratorium was vitally important to the U.S.