Charles T. Call's essay considers the permissive conditions for and long-term effects of power-sharing arrangements, widely seen as a means of providing peace and stability in societies deeply divided along ethnic and/or (in this case) ideological and class lines. Focusing on the case of Colombia, Call demonstrates that even where an extensive 'consociational' arrangement can be realized and sustained, it may exact a heavy long-run toll on democracy and security within a state.

Call presents a detailed study of the origins, benefits, and costs of the Colombian National Front, which from 1958 to 1974 dominated the political life of a country that had been (and is again) among the world's most violent. He argues that this power-sharing agreement, formed in reaction to the division of Colombia into warring Liberal and Conservative camps, was neither inevitable nor epiphenomenal: rather it emerged as a result of elite bargaining and became remarkably institutionalized. The net contribution of power-sharing to domestic security is less clear: though the National Front can be credited with a return to civilian rule and an abatement of inter-party conflict and sectarianism, it ruled out opportunities for real reform, undermining its own legitimacy and permitting an upsurge in guerilla and criminal violence. Call's essay stands as a timely warning to those who would advocate one-dimensional solutions to problems of domestic security.