Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University


Publications




Image of Cover

Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in the October 1969 Crisis, The

Journal Article

Authors
Scott D. Sagan - Stanford University
Jeremi Suri

Published by
International Security, Vol. 27 no. 4, page(s) 150-183
Spring 2003


The history of the October 1969 alert demonstrates that even in this high-politics arena of nuclear diplomacy, presidential orders were actively fought against, sometimes manipulated or ignored, and often honored only in part. Other orders were interpreted and implemented in a more vigorous manner that best suited the organizational interests of the military commanders doing the interpretation. The result was that many important details of the military activities undertaken in October 1969 reflected the operational interests of the military commanders and the goals of lower-level bureaucratic actors as much as the strategic objectives of the president. In this important sense, the nuclear alert was loosely coupled to the president´s orders.